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1“I Don't Believe in a Fun City; I Believe in a Safe City”: Fear of Crime and
the Crisis of Expertise in New York City.
In September 1970, New York City Mayor John Lindsay received an angry letter from Peter
Szanton, President of the New York City Rand Institute. Both Szanton and his fledgling
Institute, the ‘first organization... devoted to the application of scientific methods of analysis
to major problems of urban life’, typified a contemporary faith in the ability of professional
expertise to solve urban problems.1 But against the backdrop of critical investigative press
reports into Institute practices and the decision of city Comptroller Abe Beame to veto
payment of consultants’ fees, Szanton expressed his frustration at a lack of support for the
Institute’s efforts from Lindsay, and an ‘inadequate’, ‘defensive and unconvincing’ mayoral
response to public criticism of its work.2 In a little over eighteen months of operation the
Institute had carried out over one hundred studies of eight City agencies, delivering
recommendations on increasing efficiency and improving service delivery and saving the city
$20million, according to Szanton’s estimate.3 Yet where, he asked, was the credit?
Szanton sought to answer this himself. ‘[Our] efforts... are intended to provide continuous
analytic assistance, not single-shot studies... [Our] goals are not the production of impressive
public reports, but the actual introduction of useful change. Perhaps two hundred people in
the City understand why this should be. The rest do not’, he declared, hinting at the fact that
expertise was an elite construct, suitable perhaps for those ‘major problems’ and abstractions
but ineffective in the arena of public opinion or political campaigns. To resolve the Institute’s
growing legitimacy crisis, Szanton demanded ‘a clear reaffirmation of Mayoral approval and
support’ that would restate to the public ‘the special role [the Institute] will continue to play
in City government.’ Such a statement, he concluded, ‘must be carried forward if the
application of analysis to public problems is to be understood and supported.’4 Yet while
2Lindsay had quickly established a relationship between Rand and the city in 1967 –
proclaiming their partnership ‘the most important development in the search for effectiveness
in city government for many, many years’ – and committed considerable resources to the
Institute’s creation two years later, in this instance he remained silent.5 Hit hard by Lindsay’s
rejection, Szanton was forced to look to federal and non-governmental sources for funding
before the Institute was wound up by Lindsay’s successor – Beame, ironically – in 1975.6
This vignette is illustrative of a broader transformation in American public policy norms
during the late 1960s and early 1970s, an era in which long-standing intellectual assumptions
and centres of authority were called into question and, in many cases, rejected. Urban
“experts” such as Szanton had enjoyed considerable power and autonomy in the two and a
half decades following 1945, legitimised by a political and intellectual milieu which
downplayed ideological conflict and anticipated the resolution of social problems through the
“rational” application of knowledge and technocratic expertise. But having for most of the
1960s identified his administration and his city with expertise, why was Lindsay unwilling to
do so by 1970? Why did the optimistic proclamations of urban experts such as Szanton and
their political sponsors run aground so quickly? And what can this process tell us about the
changing fortunes of this brand of liberalism, its policy preferences and adherents, and the
new regime which emerged as its alternative?
While scholars have explored equivalent crises of expertise in overseas nation-building,
poverty or urban planning, few policy areas illustrate these changes more effectively than that
of crime control.7 First, and contrary to the historiographical orthodoxy, Lindsay, like many
other urban liberals during the 1960s, did not want for ideas in his attempts to fight crime.
Experts provided liberals with a variety of weapons, from civil rights and social welfare
3programmes to administrative techniques and new technologies, with which to not only wage
war on crime, but also, they predicted, to defeat it. In return, liberals such as Lindsay initially
granted experts great agency and capital, figuratively and substantively, in devising policy
responses and solutions to crime. Second, crime – and in particular fear of crime – exposed
the failings of expertise: not only an inherent elitism and incompatibility with public opinion,
as Szanton suggested, but the limits, even hollowness, of its core claims, its insensitivity to
local interests, its inability to address the personal, emotional experience of crime and its
ineffectiveness in the political arena. The interaction between these failings and the
politicisation of crime in New York – something expertise itself contributed to and often
exacerbated – expedited a broader crisis of expertise from which it was unable to recover.
The case of the Lindsay administration thus offers a window onto a wider process of
ideological and policy transformation; not simply a transition from a liberal era to a
conservative one, but a shift in questions of who should hold authority, what constitutes
“expertise”, and the broader purpose and possibilities of public policy.
It is only recently that historians have begun to probe the importance of crime – and public
fear of crime – to the decline of the post-war liberal order during the 1960s and 1970s. Recent
works by Michael Flamm, Heather Thompson, Julilly Kohler-Hausmann and Jonathan
Simon, amongst others, have done much to demonstrate the centrality of crime to the
transformation of American political and cultural life since the 1960s: be it in its stalling of
the drive for racial equality; its reconfiguration of redistributive social programmes and the
American welfare state; its destructive impact on labour unions or the nation’s cities; or its
construction of a new conservative national political majority.8
4Yet while conservative actors are the key players in the vast majority of this work, dynamic
and ingenious in their construction of a new discourse of “law and order”, liberals often
appear as passive or vacillating in their acquiescence to the new agenda. For Flamm, ‘liberals
never found their voice on this issue [of crime]’; for Vesla Weaver, liberals were the victims
of ‘political traps’ which forced them ‘to forgo their ideal outcomes and [move] closer to the
conservative position’.9 Trapped in a ‘liberal quagmire’ on crime, their war in Vietnam
inhibiting the political or fiscal commitment required to confront the “root causes” of crime
they identified, their devotion to racial justice translated by their opponents into a tacit
endorsement of civil unrest and urban disorder, national liberals struggled to present
alternatives to – and in some cases blindly joined – the conservative insurgency.10 Focusing
primarily on national developments, historians have largely maintained this narrative of
liberal weakness and failure. Few, it seems, credit post-war liberals with much agency or
ingenuity on crime: a factor, they argue, crucial to their subsequent national political travails.
This paper, in shifting the focus from national politics in Washington to local governance in
New York City, argues differently; that post-war urban liberals, especially at the local level,
were in fact highly attentive towards issues of crime and criminality. Scholars’ emphasis on
national rather than local politics obscures important local dynamics, especially the efforts of
municipal officials politically accountable on issues of crime and law enforcement to grapple
with the politics of crime and present coherent responses to it.11 Not only this, but rather than
offering ‘self-righteous indignation’ or ‘leap[ing] upon the “law and order” bandwagon’ in
response to rising crime, as some have argued, many liberal officials also possessed a
powerful, sophisticated intellectual toolkit with which to confront it: expertise.12
5By “expertise”, I mean two things. First, a body of professional “experts” ennobled by, and
embedded within, the institutions of the post-war state. Identifying themselves as reformers,
modernisers, even technicians, these experts were based initially in universities, then in
Washington’s burgeoning apparatus of federal agencies, before arriving in city halls with the
expansion of federal aid to cities during the 1960s. Second, I mean an ideology of
“expertise”: an optimistic, even hubristic belief, held largely by liberal political elites, in the
perfectibility of human society and the power of academic endeavour and public policy, with
experts working as agents of the state, to achieve that goal. For the advocates of expertise
social conditions such as crime were complex but soluble academic problems, not political
ones, to be confronted by ostensibly rational solutions. Yet despite such claims the ideology
of expertise was a political project; its identification of what was “efficient” or “rational”
designed to extend the authority of its “experts”; its ambitions, values and fortunes tied to
those of post-war programmatic liberalism.13 While not the only liberal solution to crime on
offer in the 1960s, the adoption of expertise by many local political elites queries historical
narratives which presume the hesitancy of many liberals on rising crime, or their failure to
offer alternatives to the conservative “law and order” agenda adopted in their stead.
Of course, this is not to argue that expertise and, by extension, liberalism succeeded in the
fight against crime during the 1960s and 1970s. The rise in violent crime in American cities
during this period underlines that they did not, and the post-war faith in expertise endured a
considerable crisis, even collapse, during these years. But by acknowledging the presence of
a coherent set of policy assumptions – a liberal “expert politics” – for urban problems such as
crime, and the fierce local struggles over these problems’ resolution, we can perhaps better
understand what replaced it; in particular the concurrent rise of atavistic, pessimistic and
performative solutions to crime and disorder in the latter part of the twentieth century. These
6ideas would perhaps not have gained traction so easily were it not for the presence of an
alternative, previously dominant, worldview to rebuke, a worldview which reified a very
different set of values. Acknowledging this point finesses our understanding of an important
shift in American public policy that is of continuing relevance to this day.
The politics of expertise retains a long history in American political culture. The historian
Brian Balogh has illustrated the growing prominence of expertise in the first half of the
twentieth century, beginning with the Progressive Era’s “quest for order” and the dramatic
expansion of federal regulation and state planning during the Roosevelt years of depression,
recovery and war. The result, Balogh has written, was a “proministrative state” by the 1950s,
in which professional, nonpartisan experts staffed a new network of federal agencies,
taskforces and commissions and became an ‘essential political resource’ to government.14
However, it was the early 1960s which marked the apex of the post-war faith in expertise.
Legitimised by two decades of economic growth and a Cold War political culture which
valorised science and distrusted ideology, this was an era of general bipartisan agreement
about the utility of professional expertise, aligned with the power and largesse of the state, to
the nation’s affairs. Contemporary observers noted the development of a ‘New Class’ of
technocrats, intellectuals and planners for a new post-ideological age. For Daniel Bell, these
were ‘“the new men”… the scientists, the mathematicians, the economists and the engineers’,
in whose ‘research corporation[s]... industrial laboratories... experimental stations and...
universities’ public authority now resided. Daniel Moynihan wrote of ‘the professionalization
of reform’, in which the impetus for policy innovation came not from voters, political parties
or local interests, but from a new body of organised professional experts empowered by
Balogh’s “proministrative state” and operating almost above the political sphere.15
7However, despite its claims to objectivity expertise remained an ideology dependent upon the
sponsorship of political elites – as Bell noted, ‘It is not the technocrat who ultimately holds
power, but the politician’ – and the existence, in Washington at least, of political consensus.16
Expertise thus found its purest expression during the Great Society administrations of
Kennedy and Johnson, where public policy, Arthur Schlesinger observed, had become ‘no
longer a matter of ideology but of technocratic management’. Kennedy’s rhetoric heralded
the triumph of expertise: ‘The central domestic issues of our time,’ he declared in 1962,
‘relate not to basic clashes of philosophy or ideology but to ways and means of reaching
common goals – to research for sophisticated solutions to complex issues... challenges for
which technical answers, not political answers, must be provided.’ 17 Likewise, the impetus
for much of Johnson’s Great Society came not from public demand but from the legion of
experts and technocrats appointed to over one hundred White House task forces and
commissions.18 Social scientists such as Columbia’s Lloyd Ohlin and Richard Cloward,
whose research on juvenile delinquency and “opportunity theory” underpinned the War on
Poverty, and the sociologist James Coleman, author of the Coleman Report into educational
inequality, played a major role in the shaping of Great Society programmes, believing public
policy to be the medium by which social problems, previously seen as intractable social
conditions, could now be identified, evaluated and resolved.19 Such initiatives also required
the design of complex technologies to manage them, from real-time computer simulations
offering “objective” predictive scenarios to the Planning Programming Budgeting System
pioneered by original “Whiz Kid” Robert McNamara at Ford and then the Pentagon.20
Almost every major area of public policy was affected by this embrace of expertise, and
crime and law enforcement – growing concerns as the nation’s crime rates spiked alarmingly
8during the 1960s – were no exception.21 Johnson, declaring a federal ‘War on Crime’ in 1966,
typified the post-war faith in the power of expertise to confront crime. His Presidential Crime
Commission, packed with sociologists and legal scholars from Yale, Harvard and Columbia,
would ‘replace the crutches of slogans, habits and reflex with the firm support of knowledge
and fact’.22 The Commission’s final report, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, further
reflected the ideology of expertise. Professionalisation, modernisation and ‘efficiency’ were
identified as necessary attributes of modern crime prevention; ‘knowledge’ and ‘expertise’
essential traits in the recruitment of criminal justice personnel; police departments ‘should
welcome the efforts of scholars and... experts to understand their problems and operations’.
To extend its authority, it demanded further ‘advice and studies by expert groups’ into crime
and its causes, including the creation of two White House commissions to serve as
‘instrument[s] for reform’. ‘If America is to meet the challenge of crime’, the Commission
concluded, ‘it must welcome new ideas... It must spend time and money. It must resist those
who point to scapegoats, who use facile slogans about crime... It must seek knowledge.’23
Although its findings were endorsed by both political parties, underscoring the powerful
consensus underpinning the politics of expertise, the report was not without its critics. ‘The
Commission’s staff talked with too many sociologists, and not nearly enough cops’, railed the
conservative columnist James J. Kilpatrick. ‘What matters to the average citizen is not... the
abstract of statistical problems or the sociologists’ long range solution.’ The political scientist
James Q. Wilson agreed, concluding that crime was ‘not amenable to “solutions”’ and asking,
‘What do we do tomorrow morning that will reduce the chance of my wife having her purse
snatched by some punk on the way to the supermarket?’ However, despite illustrating the
urgency of urban crime and its intensely personal, felt quality, Kilpatrick and Wilson were
lonely voices.24 The Commission’s promise that ‘America can control crime if it will’, the
9proliferation of research institutes working on domestic policy issues, and Johnson’s
appropriation of millions of federal dollars for local law enforcement studies, adding
monetary incentives to research aimed at crime’s abatement, institutionalised the War on
Crime and ensured that it would be fought primarily by the forces of expertise.25
Local officials, especially in the nation’s cities, found this expert politics equally seductive.
Anxieties over an escalating “urban crisis”, plus the infusion of federal funds into urban
areas, saw cities re-imagined as giant “laboratories” for the nation’s experts.26 Private
consultancies such as the Rand Corporation diversified their operations to tackle urban as
well as military dilemmas – by 1969, 20 percent of Rand research was dedicated to urban
issues, compared to zero in 1960 – and mayors recruited ideas and personnel from academia
and the research industries in their attempts to confront the crisis, institutionalising a wider
consensus about the utility of expertise to urban governance.27 And as in Washington,
expertise contributed to local efforts to combat crime. Police in Chicago trialled systems
analysis and an IBM computer programme to map crime hotspots in the city, initiating a
record 4000 arrests in 1964. In Los Angeles, the maiden project of the Los Angeles Technical
Services Corporation [TSC], the nation’s first ‘urban think factory’ unveiled by Mayor Sam
Yorty in 1967, used Department of Defense computer technology to enable LAPD officers to
process crime reports from any patrol car in the city. The high stakes, especially in the wake
of the recent Watts riots underlining the immediacy of the urban crisis, justified the cost of
such initiatives: ‘Properly applied modern technology and systems development can prevent
urban areas from becoming the living nightmares so many predict’, the TSC declared.28
Perhaps more than any other city, New York City exemplified both the promise of American
cities and the “living nightmare” they threatened to become. While on the surface it
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maintained its status as E.B. White’s glittering ‘capital of the world’, it was also evident that
by the mid-1960s New York had become the exemplar of the urban crisis.29 Structural
economic changes and deindustrialisation locked many recent black and Puerto Rican
migrants to the city into cycles of unemployment and poverty. Political corruption within the
local party system and civil service inhibited mobility for these new arrivals while
encouraging an atmosphere of inertia within the administration of Mayor Robert Wagner, a
leader whose vision, the New York Herald Tribune averred, ‘ends at the wall of a political
clubhouse’. Racial unrest and polarisation was on the increase: while 800,000 middle-class
whites flocked to the suburbs during the Wagner years, the city was rocked by racial rioting
and disorder in 1964 after a black youth was killed by an off-duty white policeman.30 And
crime in New York was rising fast: violent crime increased by over 7 percent year-on-year
during the early 1960s and New York ranked well above the national average for crimes
committed against persons.31 High-profile cases, such as the brutal 1964 murder of Kitty
Genovese or the shooting of a Columbia University physics professor in Central Park,
established an image of New York City as violent, lawless, even out of control: a New York
Times editorial described ‘a city where crime and violence are on the rampage’.32 This
perception was underlined by a series of 1965 articles in the Herald Tribune entitled ‘New
York City in Crisis’: in its issue on crime, the newspaper described New York as ‘a city
where no one is a complete stranger to violence’ and ‘people are afraid to go out at night’.33
The Republican John Lindsay would be the executive charged with confronting these issues.
Rather than a flailing advocate of an exhausted Great Society liberalism, unable to tame the
‘ungovernable city’ and ultimately responsible for New York’s fiscal decline, Lindsay was an
innovative chief executive, committed to the application of modern management techniques
and outside expertise to urban problems.34 In his recent study of city sanitation policy,
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Themis Chronopoulos describes Lindsay as developing a ‘new standard of urban governance’
in New York, identifying inadequate service delivery and seeking to improve city life via
expert-led technocratic solutions.35 The efforts of the Lindsay administration in the areas of
crime control and policing – initiating cultural change in entrenched bureaucracies; pursuing
improved administrative performance through scientific management, rational planning and
the use of external experts; deploying new technologies to reduce crime – reflected similar
impulses. Yet while Chronopoulos credits Lindsay with rebuilding the Department of
Sanitation, Lindsay’s attempts to combat crime were less successful. The administration’s
objectives were undermined by the resistance of local actors and bureaucracies, sectional and
ideological conflict and the rapid politicisation of crime in the city: trends which expertise
had promised to transcend but which it itself often initiated, invalidating many of its core
claims and crudely exposing its limitations. Most fundamentally, in failing to translate policy
innovations into visible results observed and felt by New Yorkers, expertise proved incapable
of addressing not simply crime but the increasingly politicised fears and anxieties attached to
it, establishing a popular perception of policy failure which would be fully exploited during
Lindsay’s 1969 re-election campaign. Thus even as his expert solutions began to deliver
some programmatic results, the discourse of expertise was abandoned in favour of
performative, “common sense” policy preferences, anticipating a wider crisis of expertise and
process of ideological transformation which would define the 1970s.
Lindsay, despite his Republican affiliation, personified the liberal faith in the politics of
expertise. His background, as leader of the progressive Republican faction in New York and
then Congressional representative for Manhattan’s “Silk Stocking” district during the
Kennedy-Johnson years, sharpened his beliefs in the virtues of modernisation, reform and
efficiency, and the power of government when aligned with expertise to achieve these
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goals.36 Though a native New Yorker, his Ivy League education and WASP patrician image
meant he often mixed more easily with academic technocrats than he did the city’s police
officers, union leaders or political bosses. Allied to his personal charisma, energy and zeal,
Lindsay radiated the optimism and self-confidence of post-war liberalism:
‘People say that New York cannot be governed, that it is doomed to stay a city where
you cannot walk the streets safely… [But] we can build the kind of city that will
capture the best this town has within it. We can turn the enormous energy and
intelligence of this city’s people into a powerful force for change... That is not a
dream... It is something that can be done.”37
Throughout his 1965 campaign for mayor Lindsay reiterated similar themes. Shunning
partisan labels, he identified himself as the candidate of change, a crusading figure promising
activist, “good government” to rectify the problems of the city and the torpor and parochial
partisanship he identified with his predecessor. His New York would be “Fun City”, a vibrant
centre of culture and enterprise. The challenges facing it were great, he acknowledged, but
not insurmountable: ‘The city’, he wrote in classically rationalist tones, was ‘[not] a condition
to be avoided, [but] a problem to be solved.’38 Technical expertise and scientific
management, Lindsay proclaimed, would confront the city’s problems more effectively than
the ‘power brokers’ and political bosses who dominated the city’s bureaucracy, and
circumvent ‘the irrelevant dictates of party politics’ which, he charged, inhibited efficiency
and reform. His advisers warned of a ‘wholesale housecleaning’ in City Hall, with incumbent
officials – often, it should be acknowledged, those hostile to Lindsay’s objectives – removed
and clubhouse leaders denied access to city jobs. Instead, Lindsay promised a government of
‘men of conscience and conviction’, who would ‘reject ignoble partisan intrigue and join in a
massive effort to make real our dreams for New York.’39
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Thus even before assuming office Lindsay began to actively create a new culture of expertise
in city politics, establishing taskforces in the areas of crime, education, housing, poverty and
transportation, each staffed by ‘top experts in urban affairs’ from outside the city
bureaucracy.40 This process of what Charles Morris calls ‘technocratic expansion’ continued
as the new mayor commissioned efficiency studies of city services by external consultants
and consulted California’s Systems Development Corporation on new computer technologies.
The consulting firm McKinsey implemented McNamara’s PPBS across all city departments
while government records in all city agencies were computerised.41 And consciously
reversing the personnel policies of his predecessors, Lindsay recruited over 250 policy
analysts, many of them with graduate degrees in city planning or public administration, to fill
city posts previously reserved for political appointees. Budget Director Frederick Hayes, a
Harvard economist poached from Johnson’s Bureau of the Budget; 26 year-old Harvard law
graduate Jay Kriegel, responsible for criminal justice matters; these would be what Lindsay
called his ‘urbanists’, his “best and the brightest”. The mayor referred to them as ‘modern
men’: technocratic experts attuned to what he defined as, ‘a whole new world, a world of
Washington, of large and complicated programs, of science, design and planning... a world
almost wholly foreign to the precinct power dealer.’42
Few policy areas received greater attention from the new mayor and his “urbanists” than that
of crime control. A keynote campaign speech on law enforcement in June 1965, in which
Lindsay identified a ‘crisis in crime’ in New York which ‘we must, can and will correct’,
serves as an early indicator of his faith in expertise. Criticising police department inefficiency
and rejecting calls for additional police numbers, Lindsay declared the need for ‘new tools,
fresh efforts and bold innovations’ to confront crime, including professionalisation of the
police department, adoption of ‘the resources offered by planning and modern technology’,
14
and the enlistment of expertise to ‘help policemen step out of the age of paper files, manual
searches and unscientific manpower allocations’. ‘We cannot afford to fear analysis, planning
techniques or technology’, he concluded, ‘we must encourage and utilise them.’43 Lindsay’s
six-page white paper on crime, “Operation Safe City”, made expertise and its ability to
resolve crime major themes: ‘At this time in the destiny of our city, all of man’s creative
genius – the genius which has reached to the stars and the bottom of the oceans – must now
be harnessed to battle crime in the streets’, Lindsay wrote. ‘I am supremely confident that we
can win that battle.’ Revealing that ‘experts have long recognised that automobile police
patrol increases efficiency, coverage and effectiveness’, he promised increased mobile patrols
and new computer systems for predicting crime patterns.44 And speaking in October in
Crown Heights, where local residents fearful of crime had organised a patrol to deter criminal
activity, Lindsay heralded the ability of government to provide for public safety. ‘Safety is
the job of the City, not the individual’, he affirmed, promising new police technologies and
‘modern communications’ that would respond to emergency calls ‘in seconds’.45
Lindsay’s crime control initiatives as mayor reflected many of these impulses. In the style of
his Progressive antecedents, he sought to reform – and at times aggressively confront –
entrenched bureaucracies and institutions, notably the city’s Police Department (NYPD). An
independent Law Enforcement Task Force, led by former federal judge Lawrence Walsh, was
commissioned to investigate departmental practices. Its report, published in early 1966 and
written by Kriegel, was a classic statement of liberal expertise applied to policing: as one
Lindsay biographer has noted, the report ‘brimmed with reform rhetoric. Modernisation was
its catchword.’46 It called for an overhaul of police operations, from the centralisation of
communications and the motorisation of patrol to the rational organisation of manpower
resources and improved statistical reporting on police response times and case clearances. It
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condemned a police organisational structure which had evolved ‘not from scientific planning
but rather from convenience, political expediency and pressure groups.’ Most controversially,
the report endorsed calls from civil rights organisations in the city for an independent Civilian
Complaint Review Board, separate from the department’s own internal panel, which would
consider allegations of police misconduct and increase opportunities for racial minorities.47
While the review board aimed to deliver racial justice and improve community relations, it
can also be viewed through this prism of institutional reformism; underlining the
administration’s “good government” credentials, restoring public confidence in a major city
bureaucracy, and reforming ‘outmoded, inefficient’ police practices.48
Nonetheless, such expert-led reformism was not without a political edge. When Police
Commissioner Vincent Broderick publicly voiced his opposition to the independent review
board, he was swiftly replaced by an outsider, Howard Leary, who as commissioner in
Philadelphia had already worked alongside such a board. The administration’s promotion of
Jewish Sanford Garelik and African-American Lloyd Sealy to two senior uniformed positions
immediately after Broderick’s replacement, conjoined with the resignation of three high-
profile Irish-American officers, led to speculation of an administration assault on an “Irish
mafia” in the department deemed hostile to Lindsay.49 The following year another outside
agency, the Vera Institute, was recruited – for $300,000 – to implement the major findings of
the Law Enforcement Task Force. Lindsay heralded the new arrivals as ‘a team of highly
skilled professionals’ who would target ‘sensitive areas in the system amenable to change.’50
Such rapid administrative reorganisations, publicly proclaimed as apolitical drives towards
“modernisation”, “efficiency” and “reform”, hinted at the political goals which lay behind
Lindsay’s – and expertise’s – attempts at institutional reform.51
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Despite its bruising encounters over the Task Force report and the review board the
administration stubbornly continued to call upon external agencies in its attempts to reform
the NYPD. In 1968 the Rand Corporation were commissioned at a cost of nearly $1million to
conduct analyses of departmental practices, from recruitment and training to plainclothes
policing and detective work. ‘I can think of nothing of more interest or excitement or
important in New York than this association with Rand’, the mayor informed Leary. Other
external experts from McKinsey, MIT’s Urban Systems Lab and Stony Brook University’s
Urban Science department were drafted in to advise the department on management and
budgeting techniques. ‘The re-design of crime prevention and law enforcement efforts could
achieve major advances in effectiveness [by] following pure McNamara-Hitch approaches
[PPBS]’, Hayes noted in early 1967.52 While offering Lindsay the possibility of savings in
police efficiency, again the political objectives of such external experts were not exactly
unclear: using outside agencies and consultants offered Lindsay a potential means of
circumventing institutions such as the City Council or Board of Estimate – as well as the
NYPD itself – which might themselves prove resistant to the mayor’s agenda.
Elsewhere, Lindsay also introduced a strategic planning operation to New York’s criminal
justice system, the Criminal Justice Coordinating Council. The CJCC responded to the Crime
Commission’s call, echoing Lindsay’s vision for city administration, for state and local
governments to establish ‘formal machinery for planning’, for ‘significant reform is not to be
achieved overnight... it is the product of thought and preparation’.53 Lindsay’s new
“superagency”, uniting the city’s law enforcement, correctional and judicial offices, as well
as the Vera Institute and academic experts, followed a similarly functionalist logic. The
CJCC represented ‘a total effort... a total mobilization of the resources of the city... a total
system of crime-fighting machinery’, Lindsay explained. Appealing to the federal Office of
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Law Enforcement Assistance for funds, Lindsay predicted that coordinating ‘independent and
polarised agencies... could be a major step in a realistic attack on crime. Only by viewing
these six functions as parts of a single integrated system can we begin to make each function
effective [and] efficient’. Once operational, the CJCC focused largely on the establishment of
‘program priorities’ and ‘standards and goals’ for the city’s criminal justice agencies, the
coordination of pilot projects designed to improve agency efficiency, and the establishment
of a central information bureau for data collection and analysis.54 Each reflected similar
managerialist initiatives implemented across city agencies during the Lindsay years, and each
reflected efforts by the administration to further centralise authority within City Hall.
The administration heavily promoted modernisation and efficiency wherever possible. During
the 1965 campaign Lindsay had affirmed that ‘with proper management skills and the use of
advanced technological techniques, we can increase the impact and efficiency of the police
force by up to 20 percent’, and once in office, he continued to attack ‘archaic concepts of law
enforcement’ and herald the novel and the new. The Law Enforcement Task Force, praised
by the Times for its vision of ‘modern law enforcement’, pledged a ‘war on paperwork’ to
free officers from clerical duties and put them on the streets, streets which they would patrol
in new one-man cars rather than on foot to maximise efficiency. Both innovations were
recommended by Rand. Unveiling a new police communications centre in 1968, Lindsay paid
tribute to the experts who ‘provided technical skills... [and] modern management techniques
[that] can slice through bureaucratic red tape’, and praised the new systems for ‘moving our
City from an outmoded and cumbersome police system to the most modern and efficient in
the world.’ Likewise new police ‘super-precincts’, consolidating 79 local precincts into 55,
promised to streamline law enforcement activities, rationalise the allocation of resources
according to crime patterns, and increase police coverage.55
18
Finally, Lindsay delivered new technological innovations in the fight against crime. New
computerised systems and models designed by Rand and IBM (Emanuel Savas, head of urban
systems at IBM, was appointed to the Mayor’s Office of Administration in 1967) were
introduced to the Police Department to replace two thousand administrative forms and to
monitor police response times, clearance rates and manpower allocations. Such systems – and
the empirical data they provided – would dramatically improve crime reporting, if not crime
rates, in the city. Lindsay also introduced the 911 telephone number and SPRINT
communications system – described by Leary as ‘a pioneering effort in this era of scientific
and professional law enforcement’ – with similar aims in mind. Deputy Police Commissioner
John F. Walsh, exhibiting the modernist fascination with technology, declared that SPRINT
would ‘do the work of the human brain with the speed and accuracy which is far beyond
human capability’.56 Other innovations, from mobile scooters and Bronco jeeps to walkie-
talkies, CCTV cameras and a police ‘electronics war room’ (many funded by federal monies
via the 1965 Law Enforcement Assistance Act), were introduced to increase the police’s
mobility and efficiency and restore public faith in the city.57
However, despite the fanfare Lindsay’s crime control policies encountered a series of
obstacles in their implementation. Not only did these obstacles frustrate the administration’s
objectives, but they brought into sharp relief the failings of expertise. Having pledged to keep
crime in the hands of disinterested experts, Lindsay contributed to its increasing politicisation
as he became further embroiled, even after Broderick’s dismissal, in a series of bitter
conflicts with powerful local bureaucracies and interests – the very “irrelevant dictates”
expertise had promised to transcend. For example, in 1966 the administration lost a public
referendum on its civilian review board, after a successful political campaign by the
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Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association [PBA] warned that law enforcement would be ‘virtually
paralysed’ by civilian review in a city in which ‘crime and violence are the terrifying realities
of our time’. On occasion the campaign, in which civil rights groups and a largely white
Police Department lined up on opposite sides, threatened to escalate into overt racial conflict,
disputing expertise’s rationalist expectation that it would displace such divisions: the PBA
ran a controversial advertisement showing a white woman alone on a dark subway platform
under the heading, ‘The Civilian Review Board must be stopped! Her life... may depend on
it’, and white assembly districts voted overwhelmingly to abolish the review board while
minority districts voted to retain it.58 The campaign was thus trebly damaging for the politics
of expertise: it constituted an embarrassing defeat for Lindsay, expertise’s political sponsor; it
served to further politicise crime in the city, pushing the experts onto unfamiliar,
uncomfortable terrain; and in doing both it confounded expertise’s own logic and rationale.
Even after 1966, Lindsay was forced into further protracted disputes with the PBA over his
attempts to reform police operations, notably Rand’s recommendation of a “fourth platoon”
that would increase patrols in the high-crime hours from 6pm to 2am. Lindsay, who
brandished ‘six sheets of statistics’ gathered by his experts to publicly promote and explain
the initiative, refused to compromise with the PBA, describing the platoon as non-negotiable
– based as it was on months of research and reams of quantitative data – and an ‘issue
[which] transcends politics’.59 Yet on this occasion Lindsay possibly needed to be political
and compromise – perhaps renegotiating collective bargaining agreements with the PBA in
light of likely new night-work requirements for officers – to ensure necessary support from a
major interest group for his proposals. Such recurring conflict further undermined expertise,
illustrating that its claims to objectivity and political or sectional transcendence could often
be illusory or worse, hollow, and often self-defeating.
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Elsewhere, the Rand studies’ critiques of existing police practices had the unintended impact
of producing further resentment and alienation within the department they sought to reform.
Police rank-and-file newsletters were sharply critical of the increased involvement of private
agencies and experts with limited law enforcement experience in their work, while interest
groups such as the PBA, dismissing Lindsay’s claims to objectivity, condemned increased
City Hall interference in police work and organised to resist the recommendations through
work slowdowns and public protests.60 Rand analysts even encountered hostility from senior
officers who had been appointed by Lindsay or were broadly supportive of the mayor’s
efforts, but now found themselves forced to implement unpopular policies. Leary later
recalled that he had ‘expected Rand to supply experts’, but instead encountered ‘young MIT
graduates’ with little knowledge of policing and little patience with police officials; Garelik
testified that the Rand analyses were ‘a failure’ and their studies ‘tossed out’. By early 1970 a
frustrated Peter Szanton informed the administration, after a communication breakdown
between the NYC Rand Institute and Leary, that ‘a relationship with the Police forced on
them from above would [not] be productive enough to justify the trouble in establishing it.’61
Such developments again illustrated expertise’s role, intentional or not, in politicising crime
and law enforcement in New York, and proved a chastening experience for many of
Lindsay’s experts. ‘Officials who expect to use consultants to force innovation on subordinate
agencies’, Szanton later concluded ruefully, ‘should think twice before proceeding.’62
Beyond police relations, other reforms created as many problems as they had promised to
solve. Kriegel wrote to Leary on several occasions in 1967-68 to express Lindsay’s disquiet
at the delays encountered by callers to the new 911 line, whilst the PBA condemned one-man
patrol cars for putting officers at risk after a number of widely-publicised attacks on
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patrolmen, threatening strike action if the cars were not withdrawn.63 Furthermore, as crime
rose the administration’s attempts at precinct consolidation were undermined – and
eventually postponed – after community protests against the closure of local police stations,
betraying an inherent insensitivity to local concerns within the centralising politics of
expertise.64 Finally, the sheer cost of expert-led solutions – city spending on consultants’ fees
mushroomed from $8m to $70m between 1965 and 1969 – also engendered a backlash from
Lindsay’s opponents and the public. Such solutions were largely shelved from 1970 onwards
after Comptroller Beame’s veto and as an impending fiscal crisis began to bite.65
Crime’s increasing politicisation in New York during the Lindsay years would also have
negative political consequences for the administration in other areas. In 1967 Kriegel
informed Lindsay that while the work of the CJCC had delivered some operational
improvements, it offered little political value to the administration; perhaps the natural result
of an institution staffed by purportedly apolitical experts. ‘We must develop some bold
programs for crime prevention which will reach down into the neighbourhoods of the city
where they will be seen and felt’, Kriegel declared.66 Indeed, Lindsay consistently struggled
to translate the programmatic innovations of expertise into political windfalls, thus attaching
a public perception of failure to his programmes. The mayor was all too aware of this tension,
scribbling on the notes of a meeting detailing achievements in police administrative
procedures, ‘Where are the big, visible breakthroughs?’67
Indeed, even when Rand and other expert-led initiatives did produce tangible results, they did
not provide the visible solutions that many anxious New Yorkers were looking for. As
Kriegel and Lindsay’s concerns revealed, many of these initiatives had transformed policing
into a largely reactive process, responding to crimes already committed rather than actively
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seeking to pre-empt and reduce crime. Administrative initiatives such as the super-precincts,
911 or one-man patrol cars gradually improved departmental efficiency – especially arrest
rates, response times and case clearances – but typically removed officers from the streets
and made them less visible to the public. That did not sit well with city residents who, against
the backdrop of rising crime, took little comfort from efficiency statistics and response data: a
1967 memo to the mayor warned that the placement of patrolmen in patrol cars had increased
rather than reduced citizens’ fear of crime.68 By 1969, the year of Lindsay’s re-election
campaign, the politicisation of rising crime and its fusion with unquantifiable emotions of
fear and vengefulness meant many New Yorkers craved affirmative anti-crime strategies
which delivered immediate, emotional impacts rather than the rationalist solutions of
expertise. ‘I am not a political leftist or rightist, but when people are afraid to walk the streets,
when merchants can no longer keep businesses open without fear... I would rather live where
the streets are patrolled by troops than in fear’, an insurance broker confessed in ‘An Open
Letter to the Mayor’ published in the Times. The newspaper also reported on the increased
number of city residents forming anti-crime block associations or hiring their own private
security guards and patrols to actively deter crime, with more immediate results.69 In this new
exogenous environment expertise appeared increasingly aloof and out of touch.
The new environment reflected the fact that despite its efforts, expertise could do little to
stem a rapidly spiralling crime rate in the city. The rate of violent crime had quadrupled in
New York during the second half of the 1960s, and by early summer 1969 it ranked fourth
amongst American cities for crimes per capita.70 Ironically, the fact that such trends could be
recorded was due to expertise and its rationalist commitment to empirical evidence, notably
the innovations in crime reporting introduced by Lindsay.71 Yet by 1969 that evidence served
to defy the expectations of expertise and unravel the consensus behind it. In March Richard
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Aurelio, manager of Lindsay’s re-election campaign, noted the ‘great concern on the issue of
crime’ evident amongst all groups in a voting intentions study commissioned by the
administration, and that the prospects for the mayor’s re-election were ‘not optimistic’. In
June, the Times’ David Burnham reported on the universally deleterious effect of fear of
crime on city life, as ‘black and white, rich and poor, young and old, have become
preoccupied with crime’. And the following month Kriegel informed an exasperated Lindsay
that ‘our comparative position [on crime] is not very good’, and overriding the more sanguine
counsel of other aides, advised the mayor to ‘avoid any discussion of our crime rate’ in the
campaign. Lindsay, he feared, could not win an election in which crime had become a
political concern rather than the rational or technical issue the administration’s experts had
envisaged it to be.72
These problems came to a head during the tempestuous mayoral election campaign of 1969,
which moved crime – by now identified by New Yorkers as the year’s number one campaign
issue – into the realm of partisan politics, just as Kriegel had feared.73 Lindsay – running as a
third-party candidate – faced two socially conservative Italian-American opponents for the
mayoralty; the Republican John Marchi and Democrat Mario Procaccino. Both men were, in
their style, demeanour and political upbringings, far removed from the rational, technocratic
“urbanists” favoured by Lindsay. Both owed their political success to the city’s bureaucracy
and political clubhouses. And both men’s positions on crime reflected a conservative,
populist “law and order” discourse, privileging emotion over rationality, which threatened to
overwhelm the politics of expertise. On the campaign trail Procaccino outlined his support for
the restoration of the death penalty and mandatory imprisonment for all drug addicts. ‘I don't
believe in a “Fun City”; I believe in a safe city’, he exhorted. ‘As mayor my first priority will
be safety in our streets and security in our homes’. Equally, Marchi accused a passive
24
Lindsay of ‘coddling the criminals’ and confessed to be ‘very, very hawkish’ on crime and
civil disorder: ‘I would give the Police Commissioner full authority to…send in the police
with clubs swinging’, he affirmed. Throughout the campaign, both Marchi and Procaccino
reiterated their commitment to “law and order”, which, the Times observed, they ‘served up
red hot’. ‘It’s safer to be in Vietnam than in New York at 3 o’clock in the morning’,
Procaccino quipped.74
Yet despite acknowledging in an interview with the Times that crime was ‘the single most
important problem of concern to New Yorkers’, the mayor continued to frame his crime
strategy as one of ‘reshaping failing institutions’, increasing efficiency and bringing ‘the
twentieth century to the Police Department’ through improved technology and
communications. He criticised his opponents for practising a ‘politics of hysteria’, instead
preferring to focus on his efforts – led by experts from public health agencies, Rand and IBM
– in improving drug rehabilitation, maximising police efficiency and computerising police
communications. ‘New York City no longer need look at what strides other cities are making
in police science’, declared a Lindsay ally in a speech promoting the administration’s record
on crime, ‘[for] other cities now look to New York.’ A pre-election Times endorsement of
Lindsay praised his attentiveness to the complexity of crime and its prevention, and criticised
his opponents for their ‘simplistic’ and ‘backlash’ approach to the problem. Procaccino’s
alternative vision of the politics of crime was populist in the extreme: ‘The only thing I care
about is whether you’re a good guy or a bad guy’, he declared emphatically.75 But Procaccino
and Marchi had exposed a significant fissure between the politics of expertise and the
attitudes of the New York electorate. It was their prescriptions, not Lindsay’s, which struck a
chord amongst a besieged NYPD and fearful voters increasingly amenable to populist
explanations of crime and punitive, visible solutions to it.
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Procaccino and Marchi took enough votes from each other to allow Lindsay to scrape to
victory with a meagre 42 percent of the vote. Yet Lindsay suffered greatly, especially
amongst white voters in the outer boroughs fearful of racial change and, with it, crime. In
Brooklyn’s working-class Irish and Italian districts Bay Ridge, Bensonhurst and Sunset Park,
home to many police officers, Lindsay polled only 1,583 votes of 7,330 votes cast, compared
to 3,641 for Marchi and 2,106 for Procaccino. These were areas where, four years earlier, he
had won over 60 percent of the vote. Even in traditionally liberal Jewish areas, such as
Sheepshead Bay and Coney Island, Lindsay won only 8,387 votes to Procaccino’s 10,929.76
Underlying racial resentments, including the perception that Lindsay was in thrall to racial
minorities, certainly influenced voting in these communities: ‘What the hell does Lindsay
care about me?’, asked one white Brooklynite of journalist Pete Hamill, ‘All they worry
about is the niggers’. But as Hamill himself concluded, these sentiments were as much a
reflection of the perceived ineffectiveness of Lindsay’s approach to crime and other urban
problems as they were of the city’s fractured racial politics: ‘The white working class will
probably never relate to John Lindsay... [but] they would tolerate him, if the machine he runs
would only function. Unfortunately, in his hands, it has functioned only sporadically’.77
It should be noted that during Lindsay’s second term, under the leadership of a new
commissioner, the NYPD quietly implemented the precinct consolidation programme, the
one-man patrol car and the fourth platoon, making savings in efficiency, further rationalising
manpower and patrol deployments and overseeing a levelling-off in crime rates.78 These
results received little publicity, however, as expertise struggled to overcome a public
perception – one increasingly common within City Hall – that it had failed. Shortly after the
election, Kriegel publicly declared that in its second term the administration would ‘provide a
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more visible service’ to communities to ‘convey an image of concern’. In private, he vetoed a
proposed narcotics “taskforce” of experts, illuminating his own personal crisis of expertise:
‘The main value of such an effort is that we would find out what they [experts] know, rather
than what we need. I do not think at this time we need publicity about experts and studies...
We need action.’79 Thus Lindsay came to endorse populist measures such as increases in
police manpower (overriding his previous attempts, encouraged by PPBS budgeting experts,
to apply a ‘cost effectiveness policy’ to police budgets), reclassifying previously minor
offences, and flooding the city’s subway with plainclothes officers. Policing strategies which
delivered immediate, symbolic impacts, such as high-profile “wars” on the visible signs of
crime and disorder, including graffiti and prostitution, would be favoured over longer-term
administrative advances. Technological innovations were now deployed not simply to
rationalise police practices or improve efficiency, but for the surveillance and regulation of
public space.80 Contracts with consultants and universities were cancelled. No longer would
technocratic drives towards efficiency and modernisation predominate over street-level fears
over crime, as Lindsay himself acknowledged: ‘No set of statistics, no program, however
impressive, can resolve the grievance of a man whose home has been burglarised, whose
property was stolen, whose wife was assaulted’, he wrote.81
Lindsay’s apparent rejection of the politics of expertise reflected – perhaps even anticipated –
a wider national orthodoxy by the 1970s. Many urban liberals and technocratic reformers
were replaced in city halls by conservative “law and order” mayors, including Frank Rizzo in
Philadelphia and Charles Stenvig in Minneapolis, often in cities where anxieties over crime
were palpable. Many of these mayors were former police officers, even self-styled “super-
cops”, underscoring the merger of public safety with effective urban governance in the public
mind and the newly performative nature of anti-crime strategies, as “crime control” became
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“crime-fighting”.82 Best-selling publications such as James Q. Wilson’s Thinking About
Crime, and its mantra, ‘Wicked people exist. Nothing avails except to set them apart from
ordinary people’; Hollywood films such as Dirty Harry and Death Wish, which glorified
punishment and vigilantism; even scholarly studies such as Robert Martinson’s ‘Nothing
Works’ thesis, which queried the value of expert-led rehabilitative approaches to criminal
recidivism: each scorned expertise and focused attention on the populist, punitive solutions
recommended by Marchi and Procaccino.83 Even though the new regime had its own stable
of experts – Wilson, the criminologist Ernest van den Haag, the political philosopher Sidney
Hook – each espoused a more pessimistic, “common sense” vision of crime than their
predecessors.84 And when Ed Koch ascended to the mayoralty of New York in 1977, his
campaign was notable for its vocal, if largely symbolic, support for the death penalty and
mandatory sentencing; its attacks on judicial leniency; its calls for police officers to be on the
streets rather than in patrol cars or behind computers. ‘After eight years of charisma, why not
try competence?’, was one of Koch’s most successful campaign lines: a pointed reference to
Lindsay’s failings.85 Considering the ambitious goals of the former mayor and his team of
“urbanists” just a decade earlier, a more damning indictment of expertise is hard to find.
John Lindsay’s failures in controlling crime and reforming law enforcement represented not
just a personal or policy failure, but the failure of an ideology. By the mid-1970s, expertise
and knowledge, the sociologist Robert Nisbet observed, had been ‘dethroned’. The journal
American Scholar observed ‘a vast deflation of prestige and concomitant loss of public
confidence in [social sciences’] claims to special insight into complicated problems’.86 The
reasons for this crisis of expertise were manifold, including the limited impact of Great
Society programming, a post-Vietnam disillusionment with government, an increasing
recognition of the importance of citizen involvement in public policy and individual
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experience rather than academic knowledge as an arbiter of expertise (thus the popular adage,
“a conservative is a liberal who’s been mugged”), and the popularity of rival neoconservative
interpretations of social policy, radiating scepticism rather than optimism, in journals such as
Commentary and The Public Interest or think-tanks such as the Manhattan Institute.
In New York the reasons were similar but perhaps even simpler: expertise failed. It failed to
woo the local bureaucracies and interests necessary to wage war on crime. It failed to
confront the root causes of crime – poverty, discrimination, the juxtaposition of private
affluence and public squalor – which still dogged the city. Most fundamentally, expertise
failed to realise its grand claims and overcome its fallibilities, both laid bare by the
politicisation of crime in New York. Having pledged to circumvent local political interests,
expertise typically proved ignorant of them – perhaps betraying its own political objectives –
and helped to politicise crime and policing. Having envisaged it could erase sectional
conflict, expertise was undermined by both the conflation of crime with racial tensions and its
own ideological rigidity. Having pledged to reduce, even defeat, crime via the medium of
public policy, expertise was undone both by the nature of its innovations – more implicit
rather than explicit – and by its own epistemology – its empirical data publicly defying its
expectations – both of which failed to address the public fears and emotions intertwined with
crime and entrenched a perception of policy failure. Such fallibilities, exposed further in the
political arena of the 1969 election campaign, initiated a crisis of expertise and legitimised a
set of prescriptions almost its polar opposite – visible not covert; emotional not objective;
populist not expert-led – which remain in vogue to this day.
However, this does not mean that historians should dismiss liberal responses to crime during
the late 1960s, or overwrite them with terms such as “ambivalence” or “silence”. For this is to
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ignore the existence of a powerful worldview – expertise – which decisively shaped much
liberal thought, action and public policy, particularly in the nation’s cities, until the end of the
decade. Even if it was perhaps as much discourse as ideology, evidenced by the rapid nature
of its unravelling in Lindsay’s New York, expertise was not insignificant for our
understanding of the politics of crime control. It enthralled political elites, ennobled new
cadres of political actors, and entrenched authority in the state at a time of considerable faith
in government. It generated a political climate where innovation and reform, rendered
possible by new technologies, could prosper. It defined new public policy goals, many of
which are still resonant in the productivity drives, rational planning and computerised
systems central to contemporary law enforcement, and delivered, over time, meaningful
outcomes for urban policing. And we cannot fully explain the emergence and character of its
successor – the discourse of “law and order”, still largely hegemonic – without
acknowledging the existence of this distinctive and almost oppositional set of solutions.
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